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ABSTRACT
We simulate quantum key distribution (QKD) experimental setups and give out some
improvement for QKD procedures. A new data post-processing protocol is introduced,
mainly including error correction and privacy amplification. This protocol combines
the ideas of GLLP and the decoy states, which essentially only requires to turn up
and down the source power. We propose a practical way to perform the decoy state
method, which mainly follows the idea of Lo’s decoy state. A new data post-processing
protocol is then developed for the QKD scheme with the decoy state. We first study
the optimal expected photon number µ of the source for the improved QKD scheme.
We get the new optimal µ = O(1) comparing with former µ = O(η), where η is
the overall transmission efficiency. With this protocol, we can then improve the key
generation rate from quadratic of transmission efficiency O(η2) to O(η). Based on
the recent experimental setup, we obtain the maximum secure transmission distance
of over 140 km.
1. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] allows two parties, commonly called Alice,
the transmitter and Bob, the receiver, to create a random secret key with the channel
revealed to the eavesdropper, Eve. The security of QKD is built on the fundamental
laws of physics in contrast to existing key distribution schemes that are based on
unproven computational assumptions.
The best-known QKD scheme was proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984
(commonly called BB84 protocol) [1]. Alice uses a quantum channel, which is gov-
erned by quantum mechanics to transit single photons, each in one of four polariza-
tions: horizontal (0◦), vertical (90◦), 45◦, 135◦. Bob randomly chooses one of two
bases: rectangular (+) or diagonal (×) to measure the arrived signals, and keeps the
result privately. Consequently, Alice and Bob compare the bases they use and dis-
card those in different bases. At last, Alice and Bob perform the local operations and
classical communications (LOCC) to do the data post-processing, which is mainly
composed of error correction and privacy amplification [3, 4, 5]. Our report will im-
prove the procedure of BB84 with decoy state [6], [7] and apply the idea of GLLP [8]
to develop a new post-processing protocol.
The security of the idealized QKD system has been proven in the past few years
[9, 4, 5]. Now let us turn our attention to the experiment. Real setup is no longer
ideal, but with imperfect sources, noisy channels and inefficient detectors, which will
affect the security of the QKD system.
A weak coherent state is commonly used as the photon source, which is essentially
a mixture of states with Poisson distribution of photon number. Thus, there is a non-
zero probability to get a state with more than one photon. Then Eve may suppress
the quantum state and keep one photon of the state that has more than one photon
(commonly called multi photon, correspondingly, single photon denotes the state with
only one photon). Moreover, Eve may block the single photon state, split the multi
photon state and improve the transmission efficiency with her superior technologies
to compensate the loss of blocking single photon. Without the technology to identify
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the photon numbers, Alice and Bob have to pessimistically assume all the states lost
in the transmission and detection are single photons. In this way, the secure expected
photon number µ of the signal state is roughly given by, µ = O(η), which implies that
the key generation rate R = O(η2), details can be found in section 4 and Appendix
A.
The inefficiency of the detector will also affect the security of the QKD system.
There exists a so-called dark count in the realistic detectors, which will increase the
error rate of detection especially when the transmission efficiency is low. The dark
count of a detector denotes the probability to get detection events when there is no
input to the detector. Eve may use this imperfection to cover the error she introduces
from her measurement of the single photon state.
In the recent paper GYS [10], the authors conducted an experiment in which
the single photon was transmitted over 120 km. The question is whether the QKD
experiment reported in GYS is secure or not? Unfortunately, based on the prior art of
post-processing scheme, it is insecure. GYS uses the expected photon number µ = 0.1
as the source, which will be defeated by so-called photon number splitting attack in
long distance. All in all, there exists a gap between the theory and experiment. Here,
we are attempting to bridge the theory and experiment.
The key problem here is that Bob does not know whether his detection events
come from: single photon, multi photon, or dark count. To solve this problem, we
apply the idea of decoy state to learn the performance of single photon states. The
decoy state here acts as a “scope” telling Alice and Bob which state comes from single
photon, multi photon or dark count.
Our result is significant because it is a bridge between the theory and experiment
of QKD. we extend the secure distance of the QKD system, increase the key gener-
ation rate substantially and maintain the major advantage of QKD — unconditional
security. We improve the key generation rate from O(η2) to O(η). Notice that such
a key generation rate is the highest order that any QKD system can achieve. Our
improvement is mainly based on an advanced theory. We do not require any enhance-
ment of equipment but only turning up and down the source power, which is easy to
implement with current technology.
We notice that Koashi [11] has also proposed a method to extend the distance
of secure QKD. It will be interesting to compare the power and limitations of our
approach with that of Koashi.
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The outline of this report is as follows. In section 2 we will recall to the proof of the
security of an idealized QKD system with entanglement distillation protocol (EDP).
In section 3, we shall review a couple of widely used QKD setups and simulates them
following [12]. In section 4, we shall investigate the former post-processing schemes
with the simulation and point out the limitation of prior art. We find out that the
key generation rate R is O(η2), where η is the overall transmission efficiency. In
section 5, we combine the idea of GLLP [8] and decoy state [6, 7], and improve the
key generation rate from O(η2) to O(η). In Appendix A, we discuss the choosing of
the optimal expected photon number µ, which maximizes the key generation rate. In
Appendix B, we introduce a practical way to perform weak decoy state, which is a
key step of the decoy state method.
2. EDP SCHEMES FOR QKD
In this section we will recall the security proof of the idealized QKD with EDP
[13, 3, 14, 4]. The security of BB84 scheme can be reduced to the security of the
Entanglement Distillation Protocol (EDP) schemes [5].
In the EDP protocol, Alice creates n +m pairs of qubits, each in the state
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉),
the eigenstate with eigenvalue 1 of the two commuting operators X
⊗
X and Z
⊗
Z,
where
X =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, Z =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
are the Pauli operators. Then she sends half of each pair to Bob. Alice and Bob
sacrifice m randomly selected pairs to test the error rates in the X and Z bases by
measuring X
⊗
X and Z
⊗
Z. If the error rate is too high, they abort the protocol.
Otherwise, they conduct the EDP, extracting k high-fidelity pairs from the n noisy
pairs. Finally, Alice and Bob both measure Z on each of these pairs, producing a
k-bit shared random key about which Eve has negligible information. The protocol
is secure because the EDP removes Eve’s entanglement with the pairs, leaving her
negligible knowledge about the outcome of the measurements by Alice and Bob.
A QKD protocol based on a CSS-like EDP can be reduced to a “prepare-and-
measure” protocol [5]. CSS code [15] conducts error correction to the bit error and
the phase error separately. That is to say, CSS-like EDP deals with the error correc-
tion and privacy amplification separately, which can be further improved by two-way
communication [16]. Thus the residue of this data post-processing protocol is the
so-called CSS rate,
ηCSSpost = 1−H2(δb)−H2(δp) (2.1)
where δb and δp are the bit flip error rate and the phase flip error rate, and H2(x) is
binary Shannon information function,
H2(x) = −x log2(x)− (1− x) log2(1− x).
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In summary, there are two main parts of EDP, bit flip error correction (for error
correction) and phase flip error correction (for privacy amplification). These two steps
can be understood as follows. First Alice and Bob apply bi-direction error correction,
after which they share the same key strings but Eve may still keep some information
about the key. Alice and Bob then perform the privacy amplification to expunge Eve’s
information from the key. The final key will be secure if the privacy amplification
is successfully done in principle. That is Alice and Bob do not need to actually do
the privacy amplification but only ensure that this can be done. In practice, Alice
and Bob can calculate the residue of the privacy amplification and perform random
hashing to get the final key with high security.
3. SIMULATIONS FOR EXPERIMENTS
To simulate a real-life QKD system, we need to model the source, channel and de-
tector. In this section, we first review the real experimental setup, and then simulate
the QKD system following [12], at last verify the simulation with real experimental
data.
3.1 QKD setup
Let us recall the principle of the so-called p&p auto-compensating setup [17, 18], where
the key is encoded in the phase between two pulses trading from Bob to Alice and back
(see Fig. 3.1). A strong laser pulse emitted from Bob is separated by a first 50/50
beam splitter (BS). The two pulses impinge on the input ports of a polarization beam
splitter (PBS), after having traveled through a short arm and a long arm, including
a phase modulator (PMB) and a delay line (DL), respectively. All fibers and optical
elements at Bob are polarization maintaining. The linear polarization is rotated by
90◦ in the short arm, therefore the two pulses exit Bob’s setup by the same port of the
PBS. The pulses travel down to Alice, are reflected on a Faraday mirror, attenuated,
and come back orthogonally polarized. In turn, both pulses now take the other path
at Bob and arrive at the same time at the BS where they interfere. Then, they are
detected either in D1, or after passing through the circulator (C) in D2. Since the
two pulses take the same path, inside Bob in reversed order, this interferometer is
auto-compensated.[18]
To implement the BB84 protocol, Alice applies a phase shift of 0 or pi and pi/2 or
3pi/2 on the second pulse with PMA. Bob chooses the measurement basis by applying
a 0 or pi/2 shift on the first pulse on its way back.[18]
As for the free-space QKD system, the setup is easier. There are only encoded
signals which come from Alice’s side to Bob’s, comparing with the p&p setup, the
pulses traveling from Bob to Alice and back. In this sense, the free-space setup is
closer to the original BB84 schemes. More details of this kind of QKD setup can be
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Fig. 3.1: Schematic of the p&p prototype. This figure comes from [18]
found in [19, 20, 21].
3.2 Modeling the real-life QKD system
Following prior papers such as [12], we simulate the p&p QKD system. The first
important parameter for the real-life QKD system is the key bit rate B between Alice
and Bob. More explicitly, B is the number of exchanged key bits per second, given
by
B = νR, (3.1)
where ν is the repetition frequency in Alice’s side, and R is the key generation rate,
i.e. the number of exchange bits per pulse, given by
R = qpDηpost, (3.2)
where q depends on the implementation (1/2 for the BB84 protocol, because half the
time Alice and Bob disagree with the bases, and if one uses the efficient BB84 protocol
[22], one can have q ≈ 1), pD is the average number of signals per pulse detected by
Bob, and ηpost denotes for the residue of data post-processing, i.e. the efficiency of
error correction and privacy amplification, which is also discussed in section 2 Eq.
(2.1). We will study pD in the following and discuss ηpost in the section 4 and 5.
For optical fibers, the losses in the quantum channel can be derived from the loss
coefficient α measured in dB/km and the length of the fiber l in km. The channel
transmission tAB can be expressed as
tAB = 10
−
αl
10 .
Let ηBob denote for the internal transmission tBob and detection efficiency ηD in Bob’s
side, given by
ηBob = tBobηD.
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Then the overall transmission and detection efficiency between Alice and Bob η is
given by
η = tABηBob. (3.3)
The average number of signals per pulse detected by Bob, i.e. the probability for
Bob to get a signal from his detector pD, is given by
pD = pSignal + pdark − pSignalpdark
∼= pSignal + pdark,
(3.4)
where we assume that the dark counts are independent of the signal photon detection.
pdark and pSignal are the probabilities to get a dark count and to detect a photon
originally emitted by Alice respectively.
The dark count depends on the characteristics of the photon detectors. The effect
of dark count will be significant when ηµ is small which implies pSignal is small. It
is necessary to point out that pdark is the overall dark count throughout the QKD
system. Here we consider the p&p QKD setup, pdark is twice as large as dB because
there are two sources of dark count, i.e. two detectors in the QKD system. Then the
pdark is given by
pdark = 2dB,
where dB denotes the dark count of one detector.
Normally, a weak coherent state is used as the signal source. Assuming that the
phase of this signal is totally randomized, the number of photons of the signal state
follows a Poisson distribution with a parameter µ as its expected photon number. In
appendix B, we will discuss the optimal value of expected photon number µ which
optimizes the key generation rate R. pSignal is given by
pSignal =
∞∑
i=1
ηi · µ
i
i!
exp(−µ), (3.5)
where ηi is the transmission efficiency of i-photon state in a normal channel. It is
reasonable to assume independence between the behaviors of the i photons. Therefore
the transmission efficiency of i-photon state ηi is given by
ηi = 1− (1− η)i. (3.6)
Substitute (3.6) into (3.5), we have,
pSignal =
∞∑
i=1
[1− (1− η)i] · µ
i
i!
exp(−µ)
= 1− exp(−ηµ).
(3.7)
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We can divide pSignal into two parts pS and pM , which are the probabilities of
single photon and multi photon states emitted from Alice’s side that are detected by
Bob. Then (3.4) is given by,
pD = pdark + pS + pM
= pdark + 1− e−ηµ.
(3.8)
The overall quantum bit error rate (QBER, denoted by δ) is an important param-
eter for error correction and privacy amplification ηpost. QBER is equivalent to the
ratio of the probability of getting a false detection to the total probability of detection
per pulse. It comes from three parts: dark count, single photon and multi photon,
δ =
1
2
pdark + δSpS + δMpM
pD
, (3.9)
where δS and δM denote the error rate of single and multi photon detection, respec-
tively. The dark counts occur randomly, thus the error rate of dark count is 1
2
.
Due to the high loss in the channel, the multi photon states arriving at Bob’s side
always has only one photon left. Thus, we have the similar probability of erroneous
detection for single photon and multi photon. The bit error rate δS and δM are given
by,
δM ∼= δS = edetector, (3.10)
where edetector is the probability that a photon hit the erroneous detector. edetector
characterizes the quality of the optical alignment of the polarization maintaining
components and the stability of the fiber link [18]. It can be measured with strong
pulses, by always applying the same phases and measuring the ratio of the count rates
at the two detectors. In our discussion, we neglect edetector’s dependence of the fiber
length because the change of alignment during the transmission of a signal is very
small.
Substituting (3.10) into (3.9), QBER is given by,
δ =
1
2
pdark + edetectorpSignal
pD
. (3.11)
There is another important parameter for privacy amplification, the ratio of single
photon detection in overall detection events f1 which is defined by,
f1 =
pS
pD
. (3.12)
Only the key extracted from the single photon state can be secure. Thus, f1 · pD
roughly gives the upper bound of the key generation rate.
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3.3 Verify the simulation by QBER
Here we would like to verify the equations (3.11) by comparing the experimental
result and our simulation. The parameters of the experimental setup are listed in
Tab. 3.1.
T8[23] G13[24] KTH[25] GYS[10]
Wavelength [nm] 830 1300 1550 1550
α [dB/km] 2.5 0.32 0.2 0.21
tB [dB] 8 3.2 1 5*
edetector [%] 1 0.14 1 3.3
dB [per slot] 5× 10−8 8.2× 10−5 2× 10−4 8.5× 10−7
ηD [%] 50 17 18 12*
Tab. 3.1: Key parameters for p&p QKD experiment setup. * GYS gives out that ηBob =
0.045.
Fig. 3.2 shows QBER as a function of expected photon number µ. For µ valuing
in the range 10−1 ∼ 10−4, the QBER has a constant value of about 1% that is
dominated by depolarization-induced errors edetector. These errors arise from dynamic
depolarization that results from the finite extinction ratios of the various polarizing
components in the system [23]. For µ < 10−4 the QBER rises as the dark counts
falling within the detectors start to become the dominant contribution to the noise.
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Fig. 3.2: shows QBER as a function of input expected photon number using Eq. (3.11),
reproducing T8’s Fig 3. The key parameters are, according to T8 [23], listed in
Tab. 3.1, and the fiber loss is 3dB (∼ 1.5km).
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Fig. 3.3 shows QBER as a function of transmission distance using Eq. (3.11). In
the long distance (l > 100km, say), the QBER rises as the dark counts become the
dominant contribution to the noise. Note the exponential dependence is due to the
loss of photons in the propagation, referring to pSignal of Eq. (3.7). If stronger source
(say, µ = 0.5) is used, QBER will be lower, especially in the long distance region.
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Fig. 3.3: shows QBER as a function of the transmission distance, using the Eq. (3.11). This
is a reproduction of FIG.3 in GYS’ paper [10]. The key parameters are, according
to GYS [10], listed in Tab. 3.1. The expected photon number µ is 0.1.
From these verifications, we can see that the Eq. (3.11) fits the experiment well,
so the simulation is accurate.
4. OUR COMPARISON OF PRIOR ART RESULTS
Now, we begin to examine the relationship between key generation rate R and the
transmission distance with prior QKD data post-processing schemes. Two ideas in
Lu¨tkenhaus’ paper [12] and GLLP’s paper [8] are compared. Note that it is our new
work to calculate the key generation rate R with the experimental simulation using
the idea of GLLP [8].
In both papers, the authors are going on the assumption that all of the photons
that fail to arrive were emitted as single photons. Later, we will improve this point
by introducing the decoy states scheme. Assuming that,
pM = SM , (4.1)
where SM is the probability of emitting a multi photon state from Alice’s side, which
is dependent on attribute of the source. Based on the Poisson distribution of the
number of photons of the signal states,
SM = 1− (1 + µ) exp(−µ).
Another assumption used here is that all the error (QBER) comes from the single
photon state. Then the error rate of single photon is given by,
δS =
δ
f1
. (4.2)
For individual attacks, the residue of error correction and privacy amplification
can be given by [12],
ηpost =max{f1(1− log2[1 +
4δ
f1
− 4( δ
f1
)2])
− f(δ)H2(δ), 0},
(4.3)
where f(δ) ≥ 1 is the efficiency of error correction [26] listed in Tab. 4.1, δ is the
QBER given in equation (3.11), f1 is defined in (3.12).
We would like to explain the idea of GLLP’s [8] tagged state briefly here. Notice
the idea of tagged state is (perhaps implicitly) introduced by [27]. In principle, one
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δ 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.15
f(δ) 1.16 1.16 1.22 1.35
Tab. 4.1: The data come from [12]. The author used used the upper bounds for I(4) provided
in [26].
can separate the tagged and untagged states, i.e. one can do random hashing for the
privacy amplification on the tagged state and untagged state separately. Therefore,
the data post-processing can be performed as following. First, apply error correction
to the overall states, sacrificing a fraction H2(δb) of the key, which is represented in
the first term of formula (4.4). After correcting errors in the sifted key string, one
can imagine executing privacy amplification on two different strings, the sifted key
bits stagged arising from the tagged qubits and the sifted key bits suntagged arising from
the untagged qubits. Since the privacy amplification [8] is linear (the private key can
be computed by applying the C2 parity check matrix to the sifted key after error
correction), the key obtained is the bitwise XOR
suntagged ⊕ stagged
of keys that could be obtained from the tagged and untagged bits separately. If
suntagged is private and random, then it doesn’t matter if Eve knows everything about
stagged — the sum is still private and random. Therefore we ask if privacy amplifi-
cation is successful applied to the untagged bits alone. Thus, the residue after error
correction and privacy amplification can be expressed as,
ηpost = max{−f(δ)H2(δ)− f1(1−H2( δ
f1
)), 0}. (4.4)
Here the single photon state is regarded as the untagged state and its error rate
(δb = δp) is given by (4.2).
Based on (3.2), (4.3) and (4.4), according to Appendix B, the optimal expected
photon number µ, which maximizes the key generation rate, is roughly given by,
µ ≈ η, (4.5)
where η is the overall transmission, defined in the (3.3). Therefore, the key generation
rate is given by,
R = O(ηµ) = O(η2). (4.6)
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Now, use (4.5) as the expected photon number to calculate the key generation rate
of two different schemes by equation (4.3) and (4.4) with Lu¨tkenhaus’ and GLLP’s
post-processing protocols.
Fig. 4.1 shows the relationship between key generation rate and the transmission
distance by one-way LOCC, comparing Lu¨tkenhaus’ individual attack and GLLP’s
general attack case. From the Fig. 4.1, we can see that GLLP is only slightly worse
than Lu¨tkenhaus’, but GLLP deal with the general attack while Lu¨tkenhaus’ result
is restricted in individual attack. Our result shows that there seems to be little to
be gained in restricting security analysis to individual attacks, given that the two
papers—Lu¨tkenhaus vs GLLP—gave very similar results. In other words, our view
is that one is better off in considering unconditional security, rather than restricting
one’s attention to a restricted class of attacks (such as individual attacks). Note that
the key generation rate R of GYS with GLLP will strictly hit 0 at distance l = 34km.
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Fig. 4.1: shows the relationship between key generation rate and the transmission distance,
comparing Lu¨tkenhaus’ individual attack and GLLP’s general attack case. The
key parameters are listed in Tab. 3.1. It is our new work to calculate the key
generation rate R with the experiment simulation using the idea of GLLP [8].
5. DECOY STATE METHOD
So far as discussed, the prior art gives Eve many ideal advantages such as she can make
the tagged state no error and no loss in the channel, however, this is not necessary.
We can control Eve’s performance on tagged states by adding decoy states. “Control”
does not mean limit the quantum or classical computation ability of Eve, but means
we can detect Eve if she uses some eavesdropping strategies to enforce the tagged
states.
5.1 The idea of decoy state
The decoy state method is proposed by Hwang [6] and further studied by [7]. The
idea is that, by adding some decoy states, one can estimate the behavior of vacua,
single photon states, and multi photon states individually.
The key point is that, with the decoy state, Alice and Bob can gain photon
number information which cannot be derived by today’s technologies directly. They
can use this extra information to “detect” the behavior of states with different photon
numbers. Eve cannot distinguish whether the photon comes from signal state or decoy
state. Thus, the transmission efficiency {ηi}, detection probabilities and error rates
(δS, δM) in the signal state will be the same as those in decoy state,
ηi(Signal) = ηi(Decoy)
δS(Signal) = δS(Decoy)
δM(Signal) = δM(Decoy),
where i = 1, 2, 3 · · · .
Our decoy state method is quite different from Hwang’s original one. Hwang uses
strong pulse as decoy state. We mainly follow [7]’s decoy idea, using vacua and very
weak state as decoy states.
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5.2 Simulation with new assumption
With the decoy states, we can drop the “pessimistic” assumption (4.1). According to
Poisson distribution of photon source, the single photon and multi photon detection
probabilities are given by
pS = ηµ exp(−µ) (5.1)
pM =
∞∑
i=2
[1− (1− η)i]µ
i
i!
e−µ
= 1− e−ηµ − ηµe−µ,
(5.2)
where µ is the expected photon number and η is the overall transmission and detection
efficiency, defined in (3.3). The transmission efficiency of an i-photon state ηi is given
by (3.6).
We remark that the Eqs. (5.1) and (5.2) do not consider dark count contributions.
In real-life, dark count contributions must be included. Therefore, following Eq. (3.4),
we write down the total contribution (true signals plus dark counts) as follows,
p˜dark = pdarke
−µ
p˜S = pS + pdarkµe
−µ
p˜M = pM + pdark[1− (1 + µ)e−µ]
(5.3)
and the error rate of dark count is still 1
2
, for single photon and multi photon,
δ˜S =
1
2
pdark + edetectorpS
pdark + pS
δ˜M =
1
2
pdark + edetectorpM
pdark + pM
.
(5.4)
5.3 A way to perform decoy state
Here we would like to introduce a specific method to perform decoy state, which is
proposed by [7]. There are three kind of signals Alice and Bob should perform.
First, Alice and Bob can study the dark counts by using vacua as decoy states.
Here we reasonably assume that the density matrix of dark counts is the identity
matrix. Thus, in theory, they will detect the probability to get a signal pvacuaD and the
overall error rate δvacua,
pvacuaD = pdark = 2dB
δvacua =
1
2
.
(5.5)
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They can measure pvacuaD and δ
vacua via experimental methods and then compare
with the Eq.(5.5). If the experimental results match the Eq.(5.5), then keep going.
Otherwise, they need to check out the QKD system setup, especially the detectors.
Secondly, Alice and Bob can get the transmission and the bit flip error rate of the
single photon state by using very weak coherent states as decoy states. With weak
decoy state, according to (3.8) and (3.11), pweakD and δ
weak are given by,
pweakD = pdark + p
weak
S + p
weak
M
δweak =
1
2
pdark + δSp
weak
S + δMp
weak
M
pweakD
,
(5.6)
where the superscript weak denotes the value comes from weak decoy state. In ap-
pendix B, we will discuss the how to choose µweak in practice.
If the decoy state is weak enough, i.e. µweak ≪ 1, at which value
pweakM
pweakS
= O(µweak)≪ 1, (5.7)
we can neglect the multi photon terms in Eq.(5.6). After that we have
pweakS = p
weak
D − pdark,
and substitute this formula into (5.3), (5.4),
p˜weakS = p
weak
D − pdark(1− µweake−µ
weak
)
∼= pweakD − pdarke−µ
weak
δ˜S ∼=
δweakp
weak
D − 12pdarke−µ
weak
pweakS
(5.8)
where pdark can be derived from the Eq.(5.5), and p
weak
D , δweak can be obtained from
the experiment.
Thirdly, Alice and Bob perform the signal state, where the final key is drawn from.
The detection probability pD and QBER δ are given by (3.8) and (3.11).
5.4 Data post-processing
Here, we would like to discuss the data post-processing for QKD with the decoy state,
mainly based on [8].
We can further extend the GLLP’s idea [8], as discussed in section 4, to more than
one kind of tagged states case, i.e. several kinds of states with flag g. The procedure
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of data post-processing is similar, do the overall error correction first and then apply
the privacy amplification to each case. At last the residue of error correction and
privacy amplification is given by,
ηpost = max{−f(δb)H2(δb) +
∑
g
pg[1−H2(δgp)], 0} (5.9)
where one need to sum over all cases with flag g, pg is the probability of the case with
flag g and δgp is the phase flip error rate of the state with flag g
In order to combine the ideas of GLLP and Decoy, we should find out all parame-
ters for Eq. (5.9). There are three kind of states in the discussion, dark count, single
photon, and multi photon. The multi photon state emitting out of the source can
be expressed by |000〉 + |111〉. After Eve gets the extra photon, the state will be a
mixture of |00〉+ |11〉 and |00〉 − |11〉 with the same probability. Thus the phase flip
error rate for multi photon will be 1
2
. In addition to the discussion in 5.2, we can list
the bit flip error rate δb and phase flip error rate δp for dark count, single photon and
multi photon in Tab. 5.1.
Dark count Single Photon Multi Photon
δb
1
2
δ˜S δ˜M
δp
1
2
δ˜S
1
2
Tab. 5.1: Bit flip error rate and phase flip error rate for different kinds of photon state.
Apply above idea, Eq. (5.9), to decoy states scheme with the parameters listed in
Tab. 5.1. We get the formula for post-processing residue,
ηpost = max{−f(δb)H2(δb) + p˜S
pD
[1−H2(δ˜S)], 0} (5.10)
where p˜S and δ˜S are given by (5.3), (5.4). Note that the dark count and multi photon
state have no contribution to the final key with phase flip error rate δp =
1
2
. The
reason why we use p˜S and δ˜S here is that Bob cannot distinguish the detection event
from real signal or dark count. And substitute (5.10) into the equation (3.2), if the
key generation rate is R > 0,
R =
1
2
{−pDf(δ)H2(δ) + p˜S[1−H2(δ˜S)]} (5.11)
where δ is the overall QBER given in (3.11).
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Through the analysis in Appendix B, we have, for the KTH [25] experimental
setup,µOptimal ≈ 0.8 and for GYS [10], µOptimal ≈ 0.5. Therefore, the key generation
rate is given by,
R = O(ηµ) = O(η) (5.12)
The result is shown in Fig.5.1.
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Fig. 5.1: shows the key generation rate as a function of the transmission distance,
GLLP+Decoy Eq. (5.11). The key parameters are listed in Tab. 3.1 and f(e)
is given by Tab. 4.1. We use linear regression for f(e).
Remarks for the figure:
1. The dashed line is the upper bound of the key generation rate. The key gener-
ation rate here is derived from the photon detection events of Bob that occur
when Alice sends single photon signals. It is to say, Bob can distinguish dark
count, single photon, and multi photon. In this way the upper bound of key
generation rate is given by,
Rmax = Q1(1−H2(edetector)).
It is obvious that the optimal expected photon number for the upper bound is
µ = 1. The gap between the upper bound and the decoy curve shows how much
room is left for improvements of data post-processing.
2. The dotted line is the asymptotic line that neglects the influence of dark count,
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which is given by,
RAsym =− pDf(edetector)H2(edetector)
+ pS[1−H2(edetector)]
pD =1− exp(ηµ),
3. The “decoy” and “without decoy” line will hit zero at some points. This can
be seen from the formula (5.11), R = 0 when,
−QSignalf(ESignal)H2(ESignal)
+Q1[1−H2(δS)] ≤ 0.
From the program (as shown in figure), when l = 144km for GLLP+Decoy, and
l = 34km for GLLP, R will hit 0.
4. One can further improve the data post-processing protocol with two-way LOCC
[16]. As shown in Fig.5.1, dashed curve outside of decoy curve, two-way LOCC
improve the maximum distance by about 20 km.
Compare the curves with and without decoy, we can find that the advantages of
decoy state are obvious,
1. The initial key generation rate (at zero distance) is substantially higher with
decoy state than without. It is because a stronger source (higher µ) is used in
the decoy state scheme.
2. At short distances, the key generation rate decreases with distance exponentially
mainly due to exponential losses in the channel. The two curves, with and
without decoy state behave like straight lines. Note that the initial slope without
decoy is twice of that with decoy state. This is because without decoy state,
R = O(η2), while with decoy state, R = O(η) according to (4.6) and (5.12).
3. Suppose 10−6 is the cut-off point for key generation rate. The two curves in-
tercept the cut-off point at rather different locations (with decoy: 139 km, and
without decoy: 31 km). For GYS, the distance is over 100km. It is compa-
rable to the distance between amplifiers in optical metropolitan area networks
(MANs).
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Here, we would like to discuss the key bit rate B, which is different from behavior
with key generation rate R only with a constant, repetition frequency, according to
Eq. (3.1). It is necessary to point out that there are two repetition frequencies in real-
life setups: the source frequency νA, which is the limitation of signal source repetition
at Alice’s side and the detection rate νB, which is the limitation of detector’s count
rate in Bob’s side. There are two cases we should consider. First, when the overall
transmission loss is not too large, the detection frequency νB limits the final key bit
rate, because we can complement the loss in the transmission through increasing the
source frequency νA until reaches νA’s maxima. In this case, B is simply given by,
B = νB. Secondly, when the overall transmission loss is large, B is determined by
the source rate νA. Then the key bit rate B is given by (3.1), B = νAR.
We remark that the decoy state idea can also be used for free-space QKD setup
[28]. The simulation of the setup will be similar.
CONCLUSION
In this report, we have presented a security proof of quantum cryptography against
the general attack with real-life devices. We have formulated a method for estimating
the key generation rate in the presence of realistic devices by combining the idea of
decoy state and GLLP. The model has been applied to various real-life experimental
setups. Based on recent experiment results, secure transmission distance of the QKD
system can be up to 140 km.
We have improved the key generation rate substantially. The main reason for this
improvement is that with decoy state we can choose the expected photon number µ
of source in the order of O(1), while without decoy state, µ = O(η). With the decoy
state, a new data post-processing protocol is developed, which essentially comes from
the idea of GLLP. We have also proposed a pratical way to fulfills the ideal of decoy
state as discussed in section 5.3 and Appendix B. In this sense, it can help to design
the QKD procedure.
Through the simulation, it is clearly shown that, in order to improve the transmis-
sion distance, one should reduce the dark count and fiber loss in the channel; as for
the aim of higher key bit rate, we should increase the detection repetition or reduce
the errors in the transmission.
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6. APPENDIX A
In this section, we will discuss the choosing of the expected photon number µ for
different error correction and privacy amplification schemes in section 4, 5. We will
discuss the optimal µ generally and then work out reasonable value for each scheme.
We would like to start with generic discussion. On one hand, we need to maximize
the probability of single photon detection, which is the only source for the final key.
To achieve this point, we should maximize the single photon sources since transmis-
sion efficiency is fixed. Considering the real photon sources, according to Poisson
distribution of the photon number, the single photon source reaches its maximum
when µ = 1. On the other hand, we have to control the probability of multi photon
detection to ensure the security of the system. On this side, we should keep the
tagged states ratio (1 − f1) small, which requires µ not too large. It follows that
µ ≤ 1, because based on both points, the case of µ > 1 is always worse than the
case of µ = 1, And another parameter should be considered is the QBER δ, which
is decrease when µ increases, according to the formulas (3.11). Therefore, intuitively
we have that,
µ ∈ (0, 1].
6.1 Without decoy state
Here, we would like to consider the case without decoy state, i.e. GLLP and Lu¨tkenhaus’s
cases. A similar discussion is given in [12]. We desire to get an optimal value of µ that
maximizes the key generation rate R with other parameters fixed. The key parame-
ters here are the overall transmission and detection efficiency η, dark count dB, and
the probability of erroneous detection edetector, which are specified by various setups.
In the R-distance figures, such as Fig. 4.1 and 5.1, the key generation rate drops
roughly exponentially with the transmission distance before it starts to drop faster due
to the increasing influence of the dark counts. The initial behavior is mainly due to
the multi-photon component of the signals while the influence of the error-correction
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part is small. In this regime we can bound the gain by the approximation
R ≤ 1
2
(pSignal − pM)
=
1
2
[(1 + µ) exp(−µ)− exp(−ηµ)]
with the pessimistic assumption (4.1). This expression is optimized if we choose
µ = µOptimal, which fulfills
−µ exp(−µ) + η exp(−ηµ) = 0.
Since for a realistic setup we expect that ηµ≪ 1, we find
ηOptimal ≈ η. (6.1)
Now, we can use the numerical analysis to verify the formula (6.1). When we keep
all parameters fixed and vary the expected photon number µ of the signal, then we can
use dichotomy method to find out the µOptimal, which maximizes the key generation
rate by the formula (3.2) and (4.4). If we fix the dark count dB and the probability
of erroneous detection edetector, and vary the transmission efficiency η we can draw
the relationship between the optimal µOptimal and η. The result is shown in Fig. 6.1,
from which we can clearly see that the formula (6.1) is a good approximation.
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Fig. 6.1: Optimal expected photon number µ as a function of transmission efficiency η, with
the parameters listed in Tab. 3.1, T8 [23]. Here, we use dichotomy method to
search the region to get the optimal µ that maximizes the key generation rate (3.2)
and (4.4).
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6.2 With decoy state
In principle, with the decoy state, we can control the performance of tagged states.
So µOptimal should maximize the untagged states ratio f1, as defined in (3.12). Thus,
µOptimal should be greater than (6.1).
If we keep all parameters fixed and vary the expected photon number of the signal,
we can obtain a key generation rate curve with a clear maximum. The key generation
rate is given by (5.11).
We would like to start with numerical analysis on (5.11) directly. For each distance
we find out the optimal µ that maximizes the key generation rate. The result is shown
in Fig. 6.2. The strange behavior of the curve around l = 125km is due to the linear
regression of error correction efficiency f(e) given in Tab. 4.1. Without f(e), the curve
will be smooth. We can see that the optimal µ for GYS is around 0.5.
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Fig. 6.2: Using numerical analysis to obtain the optimal key generation rate by the formula
(5.11) and use the data GYS in Tab. 3.1, with parameters listed in Tab. 3.1.
Now, we would like to do analytical discussion under some approximation. We
neglect the dark count, regard η ≪ 1, and consider the ideal error correction efficiency
f(e) = 1. Then (5.3), (5.4), (3.8), (3.11) will be reduced to,
p˜S ∼= pS = ηµe−µ
δ˜S ∼= δS = edetector
pD ∼= pSignal = 1− e−ηµ
δ ∼= edetector
6. Appendix A 29
Substitute these formulas into Eq. (5.11), the key generation rate is given by,
R ≈ 1
2
{−ηµH2(edetector) + ηµe−µ[1−H2(edetector)]}
The expression is optimized if we choose µ = µOptimal which fulfills,
(1− µ) exp(−µ) = H2(edetector)
1−H2(edetector) .
Then we can solve this equation and obtain that,
µKTHOptimal ≈ 0.8
µGY SOptimal ≈ 0.5
where for KTH setup edetector = 1%, and for GYS edetector = 3.3%. Comparing two
results we can see that numerical and analytical analysis are compatible.
7. APPENDIX B
In section 5.3 we use a weak decoy state. Here we would like to discuss how to perform
decoy state method in practice.
In decoy method, we require the weak decoy state to be “weak enough” i.e. its
expected photon number µ ≪ 1. We can then neglect the multi photon term by
considering the relationship (5.7). However, it is not practical for real experiment
since it will take a long time to get enough information from weak decoy state if
µ≪ 1.
Here we propose one possible solution for weak decoy state, using several (say m)
weak decoy states with expected photon number µ1, µ2, · · ·µm, instead of one. As
discussed in (5.5), one can estimate the dark count and its error rate accurately. Let
us turn our attention to m weak decoy states. With the same argument of (5.6), we
have,
p
µj
D = pdark +
∞∑
i=1
ηi ·
µij
i!
· e−µj (7.1)
where j = 1, 2, · · ·, m denotes for the j-th weak decoy state. To solve Eq. (7.1), we
can neglect the high order (> m) terms which are of O(µm+1), and then Eq. (7.1)
are reduced to,
pµ1D =
m∑
i=0
ηi · µ
i
1
i!
· e−µ1
pµ2D =
m∑
i=0
ηi · µ
i
2
i!
· e−µ2
· · ·
pµmD =
m∑
i=0
ηi · µ
i
m
i!
· e−µm
(7.2)
Now, one can solve m equations for {ηi}, i = 1, 2, 3, · · ·, m. The subsequent procedure
is the same as the 5.3. One can use η = η1 to calculate p˜S and δ˜S by (5.3) and (5.4).
At last substitute the parameters into (5.11) to calculate the key generation rate.
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How many decoy states should be applied, i.e. m =?, depends on how low expected
photon number µweak one can tolerate. Here, we would like to give out a couple of
examples. Given that η = 10−4, suppose that all m decoy states are in the same
order. a) If one chooses µweak = O(10
−3) and m = 2, then the terms neglected are of
O(10−9) and pS is in the term of O(ηµ) = O(10
−7). Then it is reasonable to neglect
the multi photon terms. b) If one chooses µweak = O(10
−2) and m = 3, then the
high order terms neglected are of O(10−8) and pS is in the term of O(ηµ) = O(10
−6).
Then, one obtains pS and δS with precision of around 1%.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard,“Quantum cryptography: public key distribution
and coin tossing”, in Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Comput-
ers, Systems, and Signal Processing, IEEE press, 1984, p. 175.
[2] A. K. Ekert, “Quantum cryptography based on Bell’s theorem”, Phys. Rev. Lett.
vol. 67, p. 661, 1991.
[3] D. Deutsch, A. Ekert, R. Jozsa, C. Macchiavello, S. Popescu, and A. Sanpera,
“Quantum privacy amplification and the security of quantum cryptography over
noisy channels”, Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 77, p. 2818, 1996. Also, [Online] Available:
http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/quant-ph/9604039. Erratum Phys. Rev. Lett. 80, 2022
(1998).
[4] H.-K. Lo and H. F. Chau, “Unconditional security of quantum key distribution
over arbitrarily long distances”, Science 283, 2050-2056 (1999). Also, [Online]
Available: http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/quant-ph/9803006.
[5] P. W. Shor and J. Preskill, “Simple proof of security of the BB84 quantum key
distribution protocol”, Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 85, p. 441, 2000. Also, [*Online]
Available: http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/quant-ph/0003004.
[6] W.-Y. Hwang, “Quantum Key Distribution with High Loss: Toward Global Se-
cure Communication”, Phys. Rev. Lett. 91, 057901 (2003)
[7] Hoi-Kwong Lo, “Quantum Key Distribution with Vacua or Dim Pulses as Decoy
States”, unpublished manuscript and presentation at IEEE ISIT 2004.
[8] D. Gottesman, H.-K. Lo, Norbert Lu¨tkenhaus, and John Preskill,“Security of
quantum key distribution with imperfect devices”, quant-ph/0212066 (2004).
[9] D. Mayers, “Unconditional security in Quantum Cryptography”, Jour-
nal of ACM, vol. 48, Issue 3, p. 351-406. Also [Online] Available:
Bibliography 33
http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/quant-ph/9802025.A preliminary version is D. Mayers,
“Quantum key distribution and string oblivious transfer in noisy channels”, Ad-
vances in Cryptology-Proceedings of Crypto’ 96 (Springer-Verlag, New York,
1996), p. 343.
[10] C. Gobby, Z. L. Yuan, and A. J. Shields, “Quantum key distribution over 122
km of standard telecom fiber”, Applied Physics Letters, Volume 84, Issue 19, pp.
3762-3764, (2004)
[11] M. Koashi, “Unconditional security of coherent-state quantum key
distribution with strong phase-reference pulse, ”available on-line at
http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/quant-ph/0403131
[12] Norbert Lu¨tkenhaus, “Security against individual attacks for realistic quantum
key distribution”, quant-ph/9910093 (2004)
[13] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, S. Popescu, B. Schumacher, J. A. Smolin, and W.
K. Wootters, “Purification of noisy entanglement and faithful teleportation via
noisy channels”, Phys. Rev. Lett. 76, 722-725 (1996), arXiv:quantph/9511027.
Erratum: Phys. Rev. Lett. 78, 2031 (1997).
[14] C. H. Bennett, D. P. DiVincenzo, J. A. Smolin, and W. K. Wootters, “Mixed
state entanglement and quantum error correction”, Phys. Rev., vol. A54, 3824,
1996.
[15] A. R. Calderbank and P. W. Shor, “Good quantum error correcting codes exist”,
Phys. Rev. A, vol. 54, pp. 10981105, 1996. A. M. Steane, “Multiple particle
interference and quantum error correction”, Proc. Roy. Soc. Lond. A, vol. 452,
pp. 25512577, 1996.
[16] D. Gottesman and H.-K. Lo, “Proof of security of quantum key distribution with
two-way classical communications”, quant-ph/0105121 (2001).
[17] Muller A, Herzog T, Huttner B, Tittel W, Zbinden H and Gisin N 1997
“Plug&play systems for quantum cryptography”, Appl. Phys. Lett. 70 793-5
[18] D Stucki, N Gisin, O Guinnard, G Ribordy and H Zbinden, “Quantum key
distribution over 67 km with a plug&play system”, New Journal of Physics 4
(2002)
Bibliography 34
[19] W. T. Buttler, R. J. Hughes, P. G. Kwiat, G. G. Luther, G. L. Morgan, J.
E. Nordholt, C. G. Peterson, and C. M. Simmons, “Free-space quantum key
distribution”, quant-ph/9801006 (2004)
[20] W.T. Buttler, R.J. Hughes, S.K. Lamoreaux, G.L. Morgan, J.E. Nordholt and
C.G. Peterson, “Daylight quantum key distribution over 1.6 km”, Phys. Rev.
Lett. 84, 24, (2000)
[21] Kurtsiefer, C.; Zarda, P.; Halder, M.; Weinfurter, H.; Gorman, P. M.; Tapster,
P. R.; Rarity, J. G., “A step towards global key distributin”, Nature 419, 450
(2002)
[22] H.-K. Lo, H. F. Chau, and M. Ardehali, “Efficient Quantum Key Dis-
tribution Scheme And Proof of Its Unconditional Security”, available at
http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0011056.
[23] P. D. Townsend, IEEE Photonics Technology Letters 10, 1048 (1998).
[24] G. Ribordy, J.-D. Gautier, N. Gisin, O. Guinnard, and H. Zbinden, preprint
quant-ph/9905056.
[25] M. Bourennane, F. Gibson, A. Karlsson, A. Hening, P.Jonsson, T. Tsegaye, D.
Ljunggren, and E. Sundberg, Opt. Express 4, 383 (1999).
[26] G. Brassard and L. Salvail, in Advances in Cryptology EUROCRYPT ’93, Vol.
765 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, edited by T. Helleseth (Springer,
Berlin, 1994), pp. 410-423.
[27] H. Inamori, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, and D. Mayers, “Unconditional Se-
curity of Practical Quantum Key Distribution”, available at
http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0107017
[28] Kurtsiefer, C.; Zarda, P.; Halder, M.; Weinfurter, H.; Gorman, P. M.; Tapster,
P. R.; Rarity, J. G., “A step towards global key distributin”, Nature 419, 450
(2002)
[29] Hoi-Kwong Lo, Xiongfeng Ma, Kai Chen “Decoy State Quantum Key Distribu-
tion”, to be published.
